Kentucky\u27s Strict Summary Judgment Standard in Light of the Supreme Court\u27s Ruling in Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center by Wright, Heather C.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 82 | Issue 4 Article 4
1994
Kentucky's Strict Summary Judgment Standard in
Light of the Supreme Court's Ruling in Steelvest,
Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center
Heather C. Wright
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wright, Heather C. (1994) "Kentucky's Strict Summary Judgment Standard in Light of the Supreme Court's Ruling in Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 82 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol82/iss4/4
NOTE
Kentucky's Strict Summary Judgment
Standard in Light of the Supreme
Court's Ruling in Steelvest, Inc. v.
Scansteel Service Center
INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the Kentucky Supreme Court decided the landmark case of
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.' Writing for a unanimous
court, Justice Reynolds reevaluated the summary judgment standard in
Kentucky. Interpreting Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which
defines Kentucky's summary judgment procedure, the court determined
that the procedure should be used cautiously and sparingly.2 In so doing,
the Steelvest court adopted a stricter summary judgment standard than that
recently endorsed by the United States Supreme Court,3 despite the fact
that Kentucky's Civil Rule 56 not only parallels, but is based upon,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.! Therefore, although a comparison
of the Federal and Kentucky rules would presumably reveal the same
standards for applying summary judgments, the United States Supreme
Court and the Kentucky Supreme Court have reached different conclu-
sions as to the meaning of the language in Rule 56.
807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
2 Id. at 483 ("[S]ummary judgment is to be cautiously applied and should not be
used as a substitute for trial").
3 See infra notes 61-88 and accompamying text (discussing the Supreme Court'snew
hbeal approach to summary judgment).
4 TIe relevant provisions of Kentucky Rule of Civil Pmcedure 56.03 and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which set the standard for summary judgment in each
respective jurisdiction, are identicah
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
KY. I Civ. P. 56.03; FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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The federal summary judgment standard stems from a series of United
States Supreme Court cases, otherwise known as the "trilogy,"5 that were
decided in 1986 and that liberalized the application of the summaryjudgment
procedure in the federal court system. In this trilogy, the Supreme Court
instructed the lower federal courts not to be as strict in granting summary
judgments.6 While taking notice of the 1986 trilogy, the Kentucky Supreme
Court in Steetvest declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's lead
in relaxing the summaryjudgment standard. Instead, the SteeIveat court stated
that "the new federal standards of summary judgment do have appeal, but we
perceive no... problems... that would require us to adopt a new approach
such as the new federal standards. We adhere to the principle that summary
judgment is to be cautiously applied....,7 Hence, even though the wording
of the summary judgment rules is identical, the federal courts employ a more
liberal approach in granting summary judgments than do the Kentucky courts.
This Note examines the summary judgment standard in Kentucky in light
of the Kentucky Supreme Court's ruling in Steelvest. Part I of the Note
discusses the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Steelvest and its adoption
of a new strict standard for summary judgment Part II illustrates the
difference between the Kentucky standard and the federal standard as well as
the reasoning behind the different approaches? Part III examines the effect
and meaning of Steelvest in terms of the application of the decision by lower
courts in Kentucky.'0 The Note concludes that while Steelveat has created
a concern that summary judgment in Kentucky is dead, the reality is that
summary judgment is still available because of the Kentucky courts'practical
application of the Steelvest standard.
I. STEEL VEST, 1Nc. v. SCANSTEEL SERVICE CENTER:
A SnucTER. APPROACH TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Steelvest was a ground breaking case in several respects. The
Kentucky Supreme Court not only looked at the standard for granting
' See Anderson v. liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986) [hereinafter the "trilogy].
'Steven Alan Childress, A New Era For Sumay Judgments: Recent Shyfls at the
Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183, 193 (1987) ("[T]he 1986 group on summary judgment
obviously is a signal by the Court that pretrial practice must become more lral-that
trial courts should not be reluctant to grant summary judgment where appropriate:).
7 Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482-83 (Ky. 1991).
See infra notes 11-35 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 36-137 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 138-61 and accompanying text.
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summary judgment motions, but also discussed an officer's fiduciary duty
to the corporation with whom he is employed." The supreme court's
ruling on these issues has created quite a stir in the Kentucky legal
community." In particular, the summary judgment ruling has caused
defense lawyers to cringe and plaintiffs' lawyers to rejoice. 3
Steelvest involved a corporate officer, Thomas Scanlan, who was
employed by Steel Suppliers, Inc., a steel distributor and warehouser.
Scanlan had been employed by Steel Suppliers for over thirty years,
during which time he acted as both director and president of the
company. In 1984, Steel Suppliers was acquired by Steelvest, Inc., which
requested that Scanlan remain as president and general manager. Scanlan
agreed, and also became a director and executive committee member.'
Scanlan's employment with Steelvest lasted only eleven months,
during which time he began developing plans to form a steel company of
his own. "Toward this end, Scanlan sought the advice of counsel,
contacted potential investors, and sought financing, none of which
activities he disclosed to any representative of Steelvest."'5 Scanlan
eventually resigned from Steelvest and formed his own company,
Scansteel Service Center, Inc. Soon thereafter, Steelvest began having
financial difficulties and proceeded to bring suit against Scanlan, claiming
that he had breached his fiduciary relationship with Steelvest. While still
employed at Steelvest, Scanlan had recruited two of Steelvest's major
1& eevest, 807 S.W.2d at 479. In Steelvest, the court looked at several issues:
1) whether summary judgment should be granted in the case; 2) whether the appellee,
Scanlan, breached his fiduciary relationship with Steelvest, Inc.; 3) whether Scanan's
communications withhis attorney were undiscoverable under the attorney-cient privilege;
and 4) whether tort liability exists when a fiduciary relationship is breached. See id. at
476-78.
' This comment is based on numerous discussions that the author has had with
lawyers in Kentucky's two largest cities, Lexington and Louisville, who have been
affected by the holding in Steelvest. See, e.g., Wallace v. Scott, 844 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Ky.
CL App. 1992) CSince the rendering of Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.,
Ky. 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991), we believe some comment to be appropriate concerning the
summary judgment concept Although Seelvest made it more difficult to gain a summary
judgment, it did not exclude it from our trial procedures.").
' As a practical matter, post-teelvest plaintiffs appear to have less of a burden to
satisfy in order to get their case before a jury. The new ruling allows plaintiffs to proceed
to trial based on a "scin ' of evidence. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text
(discussing the summary judgment standard as adopted in teelest). This "scmll"
standard also constituted the federal standard before the 1986 United States Supreme
Court trilogy. See inffra notes 45-52 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the
summary judgment standard in the federal system).
14 Steelvelt, 807 S.W.2d at 478.
1s Id. at 479.
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clients to be investors in his company. In addition, nine office and supervisory
employees left Steelvest in order to accept positions at Scanlan new
company. Thus, Steelvest based its complaint on the fact that Scanlan had not
disclosed any of his intentions to form Scansteel Service Center, Inc."6
After extensive discovery, Scanlan and the other party defendants 7 filed
summary judgment motions claiming that there was insufficient evidence to
show that a fiduciary duty had been breached. The trial court granted the
summary judgment motions, and, on appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. 1
In granting discretionary review, the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that "the
central question raised by appellants is whether there was sufficient evidence
that Scanlan breached any fiduciary duties to appellants by planning and
organizing a directly competitive business..19 The Kentucky Supreme Court
then used this issue as a vehicle to redirect the state courts on the appropriate
standard to be applied in a summary judgment case.20
The Kentucky Supreme Court quickly stated its intention to reexamine
the summary judgment standard, 'This case presents an opportunity to restate
our position on summary judgment and dispel any ambiguity that may exist
in Kentucky law on this matter.21 In setting forth the proper standard, the
court briefly discussed the impact of the three 1986 United States Supreme
1d.
17The defendants in this case were Scanlan, Scansteel Service Center, the First
National Bank of Louisville, H & M Investors, Roger Lynn Huncilman and J. William
Manning, Sr., and their respective companies, Bert R. Huncilman & Son, Inc., Manning
Equipment, Inc., and Manning Truck Modification, Inc. Id. at 476.
" Id. at 478.
19Id. at 479. The court noted that this issue was central to all the other issues and
claims. 'It is clear that all other issues and claims respecting the other appellees are
dependent upon the resolution of this issue of Scanlan's alleged fiduciary breach." Id.
' See id. The supreme court reversed and remanded the case to the Jefferson Circuit
Court for farther proceedings. Id. at 488. The Jefferson Circuit Court, upon rehearing,
tried the case without a jury. Judge Ken Corey found that the issues in the case were too
difficult and intricate for ajury to intelligently rule. Although Judge Corey dismissed with
prejudice the complaint against Bert R. Huncilman & Son, Inc., H & M Investors,
Manning Equipment, Manning Truck Modification, Inc., J. William Manning, Sr., and
Roger Lynn Huncilman, the court ultimately ruled for Steelvest against Scanlan. The
judge ruled that Scanlan had in fact breached his fiduciary duties to Steelvest, Inc. Due
to this finding, the judge awarded $50,000 in punitive damages to Steelvest, but
concluded that compensatory damages were too speculative to award with any degree of
certainty. See generally Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., No. 86-CI-04607, at
12-14 (Jefferson Cir. Ct. Sept. 10, 1993).
n Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480. Interestingly, neither of the parties' briefs focused
on the'summary judgment motion. Instead, it seems as though the court took it upon itself
to clarify and redefine the summary judgment standard in Kentucky. See Appellants' and
Appellees' Briefs (on file with the author).
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Court cases. Writing for the court, Justice Reynolds noted that with the
advent of these three cases, summary judgment would be easier to obtain in
the federal system. Prior to the 1986 trilogy, "federal courts were generally
reluctant to grant motions for summary judgment and in most instance
denied them if there was even the slightest doubt as to an issue of fact.! "
Reynolds continued, stating that the United States Supreme Court's issuance
of the three opinions "ha[s] had a profound effect on summary judgment
practice in the federal courts and [has] encourage[d] greater use of summary
judgment to dispose of litigation."' Such an effect, however, did not trickle
down to the Kentucky Supreme Court The Kentucky court consciously
refused to adopt the United States Supreme Courts standard, noting that state
courts are not required to follow the federal courts' guidelines. '
Turning to the issue at hand, Justice Reynolds noted that Paintsville
Hospital v. Rose," an earlier decision by the Kentucky Supreme Court, had
set forth the standard that most of the lower courts had been following?'
PaintsvilleHospital"determined that summary judgment is proper only where
the movant shows that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circum-
stances."'2 Paintsville Hospital also established that the proper function of
the summary judgment motion "is to terminate litigation when... it appears
that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial
warranting a judgment in his favor."" Thus, relying on Paintsv'lle Hospital,
the Steelvest court emphasized that summary judgment was not to be used as
a substitute for trial. In doing so, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed its
holding in Paints'lle Hospital and clarified the procedures that must be
followed in granting summary judgment?0
A movant must satisfy a two-pronged test in order for a Kentucky court
to grant a summaryjudgment motion. First, the movant must demonstrate that
2 Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480-81.
2 Id. at 480.
2 Id. at 481.
2' Id. at 482 ("The federal rules of procedure, e.g., F. R. Civ. P. 56, are applicable
to the proceedings in federal courts and are not to be applied to practice or procedure in
state courts." (emphasis added)).
' Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985).
' Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 479; see, e.g., Montgomery v. Midkifl 770 S.W.2d 689
(Ky. CL App. 1989) (citing Paintvile Hospital as the summary judgment standard);
Moore v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 778 S.W.2d 657 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting
Paintwille Hospita); List v. Southem. Ry. Co., 752 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. CL App. 1988)
(explaining the application of the Paintsville Hospital standard).
R Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 479.
Id. at 480 (referring to Paintsville Hospital as the benchmare' case and applying
its holding to the case at hand).
"°Id.
1993-94]
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there is no genuine issue of material fact.3 Second, the movant must
show his right to judgment "with such clarity that there is no room left
for controversy."' In other words, "[o]nly when it appears impossible
for the nonmoving party to produce evidence at trial warranting a
judgment in his favor should the motion for summary judgment be
granted."33 It is this part of the test that has created the stir in the legal
community. The "such clarity" and "impossibility" factors create such an
extremely strict standard that a movant will have a difficult time proving
that summary judgment should be granted.
In concluding its discussion of the appropriate approach to be used
when faced with a summary judgment motion, the court restated that the
Paintsvile Hospital decision put forth a mandate as to the proper
standard for summary judgment, reaffirmed that mandate, and emphasized
the "impossibility" factor:
[Summary judgment] should only be used "to terminate litigation when,
as a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the
respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting ajudgment in his
favor and against the movant." It is vital that we not sever litigants from
their right of trial, if they do in fact have valid issues to try, just for the
sake of efficiency and expediency'
Hence, the Kentucky Supreme Court believes that summary judgment is
a procedural tool to be wielded sparingly.'
IL HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF Tm
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A. Federal Standard
The summary judgment motion has its origins in English law, where
it was used to facilitate a ruling on the merits in bills of exchange and
promissory note collections when plaintiffs were able to provide enough
31 Id. at 482.
32Id.
"Id.
4 Id. at 483 (quoting Paintsville Hospital).
"See id. "[This court has ... repeatedly admonished that the rule is to be
cautiously applied. ... It is clearly not the purpose of the summary judgment rle, as we
have often declared, to cut litigants off from their right of trial if they have issues to try."
Id. at 480.
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documentary evidence. English law then expanded the availability of the
procedure in 1873 'to actions involving liquidated money demands" 37 in
order to 'educe delay and expense resulting from frivolous defenses:"
United States courts first adopted this English-based procedure in the late
1800s and used it only sparingly. The procedure was limited only to plaintiffs
and trnsactions susceptible to documentary proo 39 For example, in Smoot
v. Rittenhouse,' the first recorded federal case in which a plaintiff invoked
the procedure, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 75th rule of the
District of Columbia Supreme Court, which allowed a plaintiff to obtain a
judgment based upon a showing by affidavits unless the defendant could
show by its plea and by affidavit grounds for a defense in precise terms.41
In 1902, the Supreme Court again ruled upon the validity of the 75th rule in
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States.42 In Fideliy, the defendant claimed
that the rule deprived him of the right to trial. The Supreme Court rejected
this claim and noted that the summary procedure essentially
prescribes the means of making an issue. The issue made as prescribed, the
right of trial by jury accrues. The purpose of the [75th] rule is to preserve
the court from frivolous defences and to defeat attempts to use formal
pleading as means to delay the recovery of just demands!3
Thus, from the summary judgment procedure' s early history, one can see the
tension between a party right to have his or her claim proceed to trial and
a courts determination that no material element exists to justi"'y bringing the
case forth to trial. This tension became more prevalent once the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure officially established the summary judgment procedure in
the U.S. federal court system in 19380
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states that, based on the pleadings and
the basic elements of discovery-answers to interrogatories, depositions,
admissions on file, and affidavits-summary judgment is to be granted if
36 William W. Schwarzer et aL, The Analysis And Decision of Smmary udgment
Motions, 139 F.R.D. 441, 446 (1992).
37 id.
3SId.
39Id.
40 Id (citing Smoot v. Rittenhouse, 27 Wash. L. Rep. 741 (1876)).
41 Id.
- 187 U.S. 315 (1902).
Id. at 320.
'A FED. PL Civ. P. 56.
1993-941
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"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and... the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."45 In fact, "Rule 56 established
a summary judgment procedure far more advanced than the one approved by
the [United States] Supreme Court in Fidelity."' Federal Rule 56 allows
defendants, as well as plaintiffs, to seek judgment by requiring the party
'opposing the motion to rely on more than just the pleadings or sworn
statements4 This requirement on the nonmoving party was emphasized in
the 1963 amendment to Rule 56(e). The "1963 amendment to Rule 56(e)
made explicit that a party opposing a motion could not rest on the pleadings
but had to come forward by affidavit or otherwise with specific facts showing
that there was a genuine issue for trial'" 'Thus, by 1963, the summary
judgment procedure had progressed significantly from its origins in the 75th
rle and English practice less than a hundred years earlier."'
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 progressed from a procedure used
solely by plaintiffs seeking a quick ruling on the enforcement of certain debt
instruments to a procedure used by both parties in order to identify "claimants
who lack evidence sufficient to reach the jury and who will therefore
probably suffer a directed verdict or its equivalent at trial."'  Yet, even
though the summary judgment rule had evolved into a procedure available to
both parties, summary judgment continued to be used sparingly. This
hesitation in using the new rule of civil procedure became evident within five
years of the federal rule original enactment. The courts became concerned
that the procedure took away the parties' right to go before a jury
Moreover, "Rule 56s internal vagueness may ... have played a role in
limiting its use. 52
"' Id. at 56(c). The pertinent part of the rule states:
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
Id.
"6Schwarzer et al, supra note 36, at 447.
47 See FED. R. Cry. P. 56(c).
- Schwarzer et al., supra note 36, at 447.
49Id.
" Georgene M. Vairo, Through the Prism: Swnmay Judgment and the Trilogy, C607
ALI-ABA 1557, 1561 (1991), available in WESTLAW, ALI-ABA Database.
5 Id.
2 Schwarze at al., supra note 36, at 449.
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The lower federal courts varied in their application of Federal Rule
56. Most courts had adopted a strict, cautious approach to using summary
judgment. For example, "[t]he Second Circuit ha[d] frequently though
inconsistently, recited a general test that require[d] the trial judge to deny
a summary judgment motion if there [wa]s 'the slightest doubt' as to its
propriety, and many other circuits ... applied such a strict measure from
time to time., 53 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit showed a general distaste for
the summary judgment motion The First Circuit, on the other hand,
alternated in its approach, applying a more stringent standard in the 1960s
and then adopting a more liberal use of summary judgment in 1984,5"
whereas the Eighth Circuit had consistently applied a liberal approach to
the procedure's use.' In the 1980s, however, as a result of the litigation
explosion, the federal courts appeared to take a new approach towards
summary judgment.' It was in this context that the United States
Supreme Court decided its trilogy of cases.
Two reasons provided an impetus for the United States Supreme
Court's trilogy of cases dealing with summary judgment. First, the Court
saw a need to help the lower federal courts by stating more definitively
3 Childress, supra note 6, at 183; see, e.g., Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155
F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1946) (holding that summary judgment should be used
temperately and cautiously); Devex Corp. v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 382 F.2d 17, 18 (7th
Cir. 1967) (stating that caution is to be exercised in granting summary judgment); Dawn
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 358 (C.D. Ca. 1970) (holding that summary judgment
should be used sparingly and upholding the "scinti&a' rule).
' Childress, supra note 6, at 183 (The Fifth Circuit has traditionally been seen as
so quick to reverse grants that one district judge in New Orleans posted the sign, 'No
Spitting, No Summary Judgments'."). It should be noted, however, that in 1940 the Fifth
Circuit stated in Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1940) that "[slummary
judgment procedure is not a catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants into its toils
and deprive them of trial, it is a liberal measure, liberally designed for arriving at the
truth." Vairo, supra note 50, at *1564. Thus, the different reactions to, and the continual
evolution of, summary judgments are evident even within the same circuit
" Compare General Elec. Co. v. United States Dynamics Inc., 403 F.2d 933, 934 (st
Cir. 1968) (summary judgment only available when factual disputes are completely
nonexistent) with Taylor v. Gallagher, 737 F.2d 134, 137 (1st Cir. 1984) (adopting a more
liberal approach to summary judgment).
m See, e.g., Roberts v. Browning, 610 F.2d 528, 529 (8th Cir. 1979) (equating
summary judgment with a directed verdict and rejecting the "scintilla" rule).
" As one commentator noted, some of the advantages of summary judgment are the
reduction of court congestion, the avoidance of expensive trials, and the disposition of
frivolous cases at an early stage. Sheila A. Leute, The Effective Use of Summary
Judgment. A Comparison ofFederal and Texas SYandards, 40 BAYoR L. REv. 617, 620
(1988). Hence, in a time in which litigation has exploded, courts have recognized the
advantages of applying the summary judgment in a less strict manner.
1993-94]
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the appropriate approach to summary judgment motions. Second, the Court
perceived a need to stop the excess litigation arising in the federal court
system Hence, the trilogy came at a time "when the federal courts ha[d]
taken other rather stringent steps to correct perceived abuses of the judicial
systen"
60
The first case in the trilogy was Matsushita Ekctric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp. In Matsushita, the Court reviewed a Third Circuit
decision that had granted summary judgment to over twenty defendants
whom the plaintiffs claimed had illegally conspired to fix the prices of
television sets.' Because it dealt specifically with federal antitrust issues,
Matsushita is the least significant of the three summary judgment cases.
Nonetheless, the holding in Matsushita signalled the new direction that the
courts were to take with this procedure and helped the "Supreme Court
[place] summary judgment on a pedestal."'63
The Court's decision in Matsushita made it clear that in order to obtain
a summary judgment, the movant must establish that there is no genuine issue
of material fact." The Court noted that there is no genuine issue of material
fact for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." '5 Moreover, the Court held
that the standard for summary judgment is the same as that for a directed
-" See Schwarzer et al., supra note 36, at 450-51 ("Perceived judicial hostility to
summary judgment motions and the onerous proof imposed on a moving party
discouraged use of the summary judgment procedure, even in cases in which it might
have been appropriate .... As Rule 56 approached its fiftieth anniversary, it was
encumbered by ambiguities, an overlay of restrictive interpretations, and considerable
judicial aversion .... It was in this context that the Supreme Court in 1986 decided three
cases that addressed the critical issues under Rule 56.... This trilogy of cases clarified
the summary judgment procedure and increased its utility."). See also Joe S. Cecil,
Summary Judgment Practice in Three District Courts, Fed. Jud. Ctr. (1987) available in
WESTLAW, 1987 WL 123660 (FJC), at *2 (noting that both the bench and bar had
misconceptions regarding how summary judgment should be used. Thus, in this context
the Supreme Court "clarified the standards for summary judgment" by the trilogy, creating
a "greater receptivity toward its use.").
""Whethe this trilogy represents a radical departure from past summary judgment
practice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ("Rule 56") is a subject for debate.
Practically, however, the decisions clearly advocate more liberal use of summary
judgment and thus provide a more hospitable climate for bringing summary judgment
motions." Vairo, supra note 50, at *1559.
"Id.
61 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
6Id. at 582.
"Vairo, supra note 50, at *1587.
"Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-86.
6' Id. at 588 (citations omitted).
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verdict."6 Lastly, the Court "indicate[dl that the underlying substantive law
will be implicated in determining [the] reasonableness of inferences drawn
from summary judgment proof; and that a certain degree of qualitative review
will be allowed in deciding the motion, especially in regard to the persuasive-
ness and plausibility of those inferences:'"
The second case in the trilogy, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.," dealt
with a libel suit and addressed the standard of proof required in order to go
forward on a summary judgment motion 69 In Anderson, the Court reaf-
firmed its determination from Matsushita that the standard for summary
judgment parallels the standard for a directed verdict70 The Court also
announced that, in determining whether or not to grant the motion, the court
must use the substantive evidentiary standard that would guide a jury.
[W]e conclude that the determination of whether a given factual dispute
requires submission to ajury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary
standards that apply to the case. This is true at boththe directed verdict and
summary judgment stages. Consequently, where the ... "clear and
convincing" evidence requirement applies, the trial judge's summary
judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the
evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard
could reasonably find for either the plaintif or the defendant.7! '
Finally, the Court noted that in weighing the evidence, a court must view it
in a light most favorable to the nonmovantn and that "[o]nly disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted. '
"Id.
Leute, supra note 57, at 623.
6 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
The Court stated the question as "whether the clear-and-convincing-evidence
requirement must be considered by a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment
under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a case to which New York limes
applies." Id. at 244. In Now York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), a libel suit
brought by a public official, the Court held that the First Amendment requires the plaintiff
to show that the defendant acted with actual malice in publishing the defamatory
statement. Id. at 279-80. The Court in New York Times further held that such actual
malice must be shown with "convincing clarity." Id. at 285-86.
"oAnderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
71 Id. at 255.
' Schwarze et al., supra note 36, at 451.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
1993-94]
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The last and most significant case of the trilogy is Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett.74 In Celotex, Myrtle Catrett alleged that her husband had been
exposed to the defendant's asbestos and died as a result of such exposure.
Catrett brought a wrongful death action against Celotex Corporation, the
manufacturer/distributor of the asbestos products to which Catrett alleged
that her husband had been exposed." Celotex moved for summary
judgment, claiming that Catrett had failed to put forth evidence to support
her pleadings. 6 Catrett countered Celotex's motion by presenting
documents in support of her claim. Celotex objected, claiming that
because the documents were inadmissible, they could not be considered
in determining whether summary judgment was proper.' The trial court
granted summary judgment for Celotex, but the court of appeals reversed
on the basis that Celotex had not supported its motion with evidence
negating Catrett's claim.7' Hence, because of a conflict in the circuits
over whether the movant must support his motion with evidence tending
to negate the nonmovant's claim, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine the factors that the federal courts must consider and the
standard that they must use when presented with a summary judgment
motion.79 Consequently, Celotex was the trilogy case that made the
greatest impact in liberalizing the summary judgment standard.
The Celotex court held that the evidence that the movant or non-
movant must present in order to obtain a favorable ruling on summary
judgment depends upon who has the burden of proof."0 The movant
always has the initial responsibility of showing that there is not a factual
dispute that would require the claim to go forward.8 The movant who
bears the burden of proof at trial does not, however, actually have to
disprove the adverse party's claim or even present affidavits to support his
motion.' Similarly, if the movant does not bear the burden in the case,
- 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
71 Id. at 319.
76id.
77 Id. at 320.
4 Id. at 319.
79Id.
"0 Id. at 322. "In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden of proof of triaL" Id.
"Id. at 323.
'2 Id. The Court explained that there is "no express or implied requirement in Rule
56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or simil materials negating
the opponent's claim," and that any question as to whether affidavits are required at all
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the movant need only show that the adverse party has failed to "make a
sufficient showing on an essential element of [her] case with respect to
which [she has] the burden of proof."' The nonmovant, on the other
hand, is required to "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,
or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,'
designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial' 8'' The Court noted that for the nonmoving party to be successful
in rebutting the movant's claim that no genuine factual dispute exists,
affidavits are important, but not mandatory.8 Lastly, the Court explained
that evidence used to oppose a summary judgment motion need not be in
a form admissible at trial In other words, "Rule 56(e) permits a proper
summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of
evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c) except the mere pleadings
themselves."'
6
Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex, hence, clarified for the federal
courts the appropriate analysis for summary judgment and indicated a
new attitude by the United States Supreme Court." In fact through this
trilogy,
[S]ummary judgment has become recognized not only as a procedure for
avoiding unnecessary trials on insufficient claims or defenses but also as an
effective case management device to identify and narrow issues....
Properly used, summary judgment helps strip away the underbrush and lay
bare the heart of the controversy between the parties.
The lower federal courts, recognizing the Supreme Court's new
attitude that summary judgment is not a tool to be sparingly and
cautiously applied, are no longer as hesitant to grant summary judgment
is "clearly removed" by the language of the Rule itself. Id.
13 Id. The Court later explained that the movant can meet his burden merely by
demonstrating a lack of evidence in support of the nonmovant's position and that the
movant does not have "to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact, even with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the
burden of proof." Id. at 325.
" Id. at 324 (quoting FED. . CIV. P. 56(e)).
'Id.
UId
'7Schwarzer et al., slpra note 36, at 451.
"Id. 'This trilogy of cases clarified the summary judgment procedure and increased
its utility.... The Supreme Court had it right almost ninety years ago when it said
summary judgment 'prescribes the means of making an issue.'... It can offer a fast track
to a decision or at least substantially ,shorten the track" Id. at 451-52 (citations omitted).
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motions.89 In fact, the Supreme Courts decision in Celotex established an
"even-handed approach to summary judgment."" Indeed, "summary
judgment is given significant procedural strength, and is raised as a bulwark
against claims based on speculation and inference.:'" In fact, a study
involving summary judgment practice, conducted in three federal district
courts (located in Pennsylvania, California, and Maryland) prior to the trilogy,
examined the recent shift in the summary judgment standard by the United
States Supreme Court and noted that "it is possible that a broad shift in
practice favoring summary judgment is taking place across all federal district
courts. Similarly, another study states that "the early returns on these
Supreme Court cases show that lower courts are getting the message." 3
The Supreme Court's trilogy not only has made an impact in the lower
federal courts, but also has had an influence on state courts as wellV Some
states have remained firm in not allowing the trilogy to persuade them,95
while other states have scrutinized their current standards in light of the new
liberal federal approach?' For example, Texas, like Kentucky, has rejected
" .eute, supra note 57, at 618. For example, a United States District Court in
Kansas that took the more liberal approach and granted summary judgment to the third-
party defendant specifically cited to the holdings in Anderson and Celotex in order to
grant the summary judgment motion. See Emis v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 825
F. Supp. 962, 963, 966 (D. Kan. 1993). The United States District Court sitting in the
Western District of Kentucky specifically utilized the Anderson decision; the court applied
the substantive evidentiary law when determining whether to grant a summary judgment
motion. Employing Anderson's "clear and convincing" standard, the court ruled that the
defendant should be granted his motion for summary judgment. See Agnew Truck Serv.,
Inc. v. Ranger Nationwide, Inc., No. 90-00340(j), 1992 WL 437629, at *6 (W.D. Ky.
1992).
90 Raynor v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 643 F. Supp. 238, 245 (D.D.C. 1986).
91 Id.
2 Cecil, supra note 58, at *2.
Childress, supra note 6, at 193. For example, in Raynor v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 643 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1986), the court stated that in light of Celotex, "it is
questionable whether courts may continue to conduct a policy-oriented resolution of
summary judgment motions:' Id. at 245.
' See Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Summary Judgment at the Crossroads: The Impact
of the Celotex Tilogy, 12 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 1 n.3 ("A LEXIS search has revealed over
3000 bitations to Celotex in published state and federal court opinions as of March
1990.").
" See, e.g., Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480-83 (Ky.
1991); CKB & Assoc., Inc. v. Moore McCormack Petroleum, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 653, 655
(Tex. 1987) (discussing summary judgment standards and insisting that a defendant
moving for summary judgment firmly prove each element of his defense).
' See, e.g., Onne Sch. v. Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000, 1005-09 (Ariz. 1990) (discussing
each member of the trilogy and adopting the federal approach).
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the United States Supreme Court's approach. "In Texas, the standards for
granting summary judgment do not reflect any of the recent changes in
the federal system." 7 Texas still applies a strict standard to granting
summary judgment motions. The Texas Supreme Court announced that
the purpose of summary judgment is to cut through "patently unmeritor-
ious claims or untenable defenses," 8 but not to do so at the risk of
depriving a litigant of his/her right to trial." Interestingly, as with
Kentucky's summary judgment rule, the Texas rule differs little from the
federal rule in its language."° The difference in standards, once again,
results from the interpretations of the courts.'0 '
Unlike Kentucky and Texas, Hawaii's courts have been influenced by
the United States Supreme Court's rulings. "Several recent Hawaii cases
use language indicating allegiance to some aspects of the reformulated
federal summary judgment standards .... ,'o The Hawaii experience
is significant because, like Texas and Kentucky, Hawaii courts have
traditionally tended to disfavor summary judgments and have granted
them with extraordinary reluctance.'03 Similarly, Massachusetts has
demonstrated more deference to the new federal approach.
By adopting the Celotex standard, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts eliminated the disparity between the Massachusetts and
federal standards regarding a movant's burden to prevail on summary
judgment and refocused attention on Rule 56 as a beneficial mechanism
for disposing of frivolous claims. Following the federal summary
judgment standard, the court has enabled a party to more easily secure
summary judgment motions.1
4
97Leute, supra note 57, at 619.
" Id. at 631.
9 Id.
'0 0 Id. at 617 nl.
'1' Id. at 635. ("Although the Texas courts and those of the federal system currently
interpret their respective summary judgment rules differently, the two rules are very
' Yamamoto et al., supra note 94, at 26. Hawaii cases that have cited to Celotex and
Anderson include First Hawaiian Bank v. Weeks, 772 P.2d 1187 (Haw. 1989), and Hall
v. State, 756 P.2d 1048 (Haw. Ct. App. 1988).
10 Yamamoto et al., supra note 94, at 12.
'o' Mark C. Wilson, Case Comment Civil Procedure-Massahusetts Adopts the
Federal Swnmary Judgment Standard-Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass.
706, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991), 26 Sur oLK U. L. REv. 191, 197-98 (Spring 1992) (praising
the Massachusetts court's adoption of the new federal summary judgment standard)
(citations omitted).
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Hence, the effect of the trilogy can be seen not only in the federal court
system, but in the state systems as well.
B. Kentucky Standard
In Steelvest, the Kentucky Supreme Court declined to adopt the
federal summary judgment approach, which liberalized the standard and
sought to lessen the hesitance that federal courts had displayed in granting
summary judgment motions. The Kentucky Supreme Court, in fact, went
in the opposite direction. The high court decided to maintain the
substantial burden placed on parties requesting summary judgment by
holding the lower state courts to a more stringent approach. The
Kentucky approach limits the use of summary judgments to only
exceedingly clear cases showing no material factual disputes."05 The
Kentucky Supreme Court basically adopted the traditional federal
"scintilla" of evidence approach."° The landmark case of Steelvest thus
reaffirmed and reestablished a stricter summary judgment approach in
Kentucky.
10 7
Even before Steelvest, Kentucky case law reflected a cautious
approach to granting summary judgments. For a summary judgment to be
granted, the movant had to establish that no genuine issue of material fact
existed within the case.' If the court believed that there was even a
"scintilla" of evidence in support of the case, then the case had to
proceed on to trial. Moreover, Kentucky law stated:
"All doubts are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing the
motion. The movant should not succeed unless a right to judgment is
shown with such clarity that there is no room left for the controversy
and it is established that the adverse party cannot prevail under any
circu stances.' '109
Thus, the above Kentucky standard is similar to the approach that the
federal courts took before the trilogy.
... See generally Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476,480-83
(Ky. 1991) (comparing summary judgment practice in Kentucky and the federal court
system and choosing to remain with a more restrictive view of summary judgment).
106 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986) ("Formerly it was
held that if there was what is called a scintilla of evidence in support of a case the judge
was bound to leave it to the jury....").
'" See Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 482.
103 Isaacs v. Cox, 431 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Ky. 1968).
'0' Id. (quoting 7 CLAY, KENT CKY PRACnCE, at 164).
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The Kentucky Supreme Court reemphasized this strict approach for
granting summary judgments in its decision in PaintsWille Hospital Co.
v. Rose."0 In Paintsville Hospital, the Kentucky Supreme Court created
a more exact approach. The court reiterated that the movant must show
with clarity that no genuine factual disputes exist and must demonstrate
that the adverse party cannot prevail "under any circumnstances.""' Such
an approach would seem to be strict enough to guarantee that the
summary judgment procedure would be used sparingly and cautiously.
Yet, the Kentucky Supreme Court apparently felt compelled to provide
further clarification. Consequently, the court solidified this strict approach
by creating an "impossiility" factor: 'The proper function for a summary
judgment in a case of this nature 'is to terminate litigation when, as a
matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent
to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor and
against the movant." ''  The court noted that even ff the nonmovant
were unable to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed,
summary judgment would still be improper ff the movant had not shown
the absence of a genuine, material factual dispute."' Finally, the
Paintsville Hospital court explained that the standard for summary
judgment in Kentucky is not to be equated to the directed verdict
standard"
4
In Paintsville Hospital, which was decided in the year prior to the
1986 trilogy decisions, the Kentucky Supreme Court clearly sought to
prevent the liberal use of the summary judgment procedure. The court
instead reestablished a standard similar to the federal system's pre-1986
"scintilla" standard, actually exacting a higher standard. By establishing
the term "impossible" as the standard of measurement to use when
considering whether the respondent would be able to produce evidence
at trial to warrant a favorable judgment, the court placed a heavy burden
on the movant; thus, it restricted the use of summary judgment.
The cases decided after PainWille Hospital and prior to Steelvest
generally show a deference to the Kentucky Supreme Court's strict
interpretation of the correct standard for the summary judgment proce-
dure." ' Some of the lower courts did proceed to grant summary
"0 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985).
m Id. at 256.
"
2 Id. (quoting Roberson v. Lampton, 516 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Ky. 1974)) (emphasis
added).
11 Id.
114 Id
.. See MCI Mining Corp. v. Stacy, 785 S.W.2d 491, 495-96 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989)
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judgment motions, however, by looking towards the United States Supreme
Courts rulings in Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex for guidance and by
balancing the federal approach with that of the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Paintsville Hospital.n6 For instance, in Smith v. Food Concepts, Inc.,"
7
Food Concepts sought and was granted a summary judgment by the trial
court against the plaintiffs, Daniel and Patricia Smith."8 The Smiths
appealed, arguing that the case should proceed to trial because a genuine issue
of material fact was still present."9 The Smith court of appeals acknowl-
edged that in Paintsvile Hospital the Kentucky Supreme Court had
encouraged the lower courts "to be extremely parsimonious when presented
with motions under CR 56."' 0 Yet, the Smith court, in deciding whether
the summary judgment was proper, stated that "the analysis of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(c) (which corresponds to our CR 56.03) by the
Spreme Court of the United States in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett is help-
f "2 ' Consequently, the court affirmed ihe trial court's granting of a
summary judgment to Food Concepts, agreeing with the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning in Celotex and stating that "in a case such as the
one before us, a summary judgment is particularly appropriate:"' There-
(stating that summary judgment was improper because of a remaining factual dispute and
citing Isaacs v. Cox, 431 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1968)); Montgomery v. Midkiff, 770 S.W.2d
689, 691 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Paintsville Hospital and holding that summary
judgment was improvidently granted); Gill v. Warren, 751 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Ky. Ct. App.
1988) (treating motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment because information
extraneous to the motion was considered and holding that summary judgment was
improper because material facts were still in dispute).
'"See Moore v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 778 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989)
(citing to Gill, 751 S.W.2d 33 and Paintsville Hospital, 683 S.W.2d 255, in sustaining the
grant of a summary judgment motion as to liability); Smith v. Food Concepts, Inc., 758
S.W.2d 437, 438-39 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (citing to both Celotex and Paintsville Hospital
in permitting summary judgment and noting that while trial courts have been admonished
by the Paintsville Hospital decision to be parsimonious with granting the motion, Celotex
and other recent cases represent the original goal of the summary judgment procedure);
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc. v. Baxter, 713 S.W.2d 478, 479-80 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986)
(citing to neither Paintsville Hospital nor Celotex in affirming a summary judgment
motion, but discussing summary judgment standards).
The lower courts are not the only courts that have attempted to reconcile the trilogy
with the Kentucky standard. ee Humana of Kentucky, Inc. v. Seitz, 796 S.W.2d 1, 3-4
(Ky. 1990) (upholding summary judgment and citing to Anderson).
.. 758 S.W.2d 437 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988).
. Id. at 438.
119 Id
12
0 Id. at 439.
12 Id. at 438-39.
'2 Id. at 439.
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fore, in the years leading up to the Steelvest decision, the rationale and
analysis contained in the U.S. Supreme Court's trilogy did trickle down
to Kentucky state courts and made a small impact on decisions as to
when to grant the summary judgment motion.
In 1991, the Kentucky Supreme Court made a conscious effort
through Steelvest to put forth a clear and unambiguous standard for the
lower state courts to follow in deciding whether to grant summary
judgments.' The court reaffirmed the strict standard that it had
adopted in its 1985 decision in Paintsville Hospital and described the
differences between Kentucky's summary judgment standard and the new
federal standard under the 1986 trilogy decisions.' The high court of
Kentucky made it clear that it would not be swayed by the United States
Supreme Court's 1986 rulings and would adhere to the belief that
summary judgment should be applied cautiously in Kentucky in order to
ensure that a litigant with a valid claim or defense has his day in
court. 5
In deciding to reiterate the standard announced in Paintwille
Hospital, the Kentucky Supreme Court engaged in an in-depth
comparison of summary judgment practice in Kentucky courts and in
federal courts. The Steelvest court found both similarities and major
differences in the treatment of summary judgment motions in the two
court systems? 6 First, the court noted that under both court systems the
movant has the initial burden of showing the trial court the absence of a
genuine dispute regarding material facts. 7 However, the specific
requirements for satisfying the initial burden that the two court systems
place on the movant differs. In the federal system, the movant must only
show that the adverse party has insufficient evidence regarding an
essential element of her claim, whereas in the Kentucky system, the
movant is required to establish through a production of evidence, that a
genuine issue of material fact does not exist."" Hence, in Kentucky, the
mov-nt must essentially negate the existence of an issue, a standard
which the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected in Celotex as
being too strict.'
- Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991).
124 Id. at 480-83.
v Id. at 482-83.
12 Id. at 481-82.
'I Id. at 482.
1m Id.
I Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
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Second, the Steelvest Court explained that the two court systems view
the relationship between the directed verdict and the summary judgment
standards differently. The federal courts apply the same test for both
summary judgment and directed verdict.13 In the Kentucky court
system, however, the court stated that because summary judgment takes
the case away from the trier of fact before any of the evidence is actually
heard, the summary judgment inquiry "requires a greater judicial
determination and discretion."'31
Third, the Steelvest Court admitted that in both systems the non-
movant cannot defeat a properly supported motion without presenting "at
least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial."' 3 However, the amount of evidence that is
required to defeat a summary judgment motion differs in each system. In
the federal court system, even if the party opposing a properly supported
summary judgment motion presents a "scintilla" of evidence, a summary
judgment will be granted. 33 To defeat a summary judgment motion, the
nonmovant's evidence must rise to the level of that "on which a jury
could reasonably return a verdict in the respondent's favor,'W3  which
requires more than a "scintilla" of evidence. Thus, the federal system has
discarded its scintilla of evidence approach for an approach that focuses
on whether there exists a genuine, material factual dispute. The Kentucky
system, on the other hand, has basically adopted and strengthened the
traditional federal scintilla of evidence approach. In Kentucky, a movant
cannot succeed on a summary judgment motion unless the movant can
demonstrate "his right to judgment ... with such clarity that there is no
room left for controversy."" 5 This can occur "[o]nly where it appears
impossible for the nonmoving party to produce evidence at trial warrant-
ing a judgment in his favor."
136
The factors of "such clarity" and "impossibility" are the aspects of
the summary judgment standard that have made the Steelvest decision so
controversial. These two factors made an already strict standard, but not
an impossible one under Paintsville Hospital, an unattainable standard to
meet in the eyes of many.
37
-0 Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 482.
131 Id.
13 id. (citations omitted).
13 Id.
V44 Id.
"3 Id. (citation omitted).
36 Id. (citations omitted).
' This standard has caused an outcry by mainly defense lawyers, who typically rely
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Il. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN KENTUCKY AFTER 1991:
APPLICAnON OF STEELVEST, .Nc. v. SCANSTEEL
SERVICE CENTER BY KENTUCKY COURTS
Because Steelvest is a Kentucky Supreme Court case, the lower state
courts addressing the issue of summary judgment are required to apply
its holdings. In deciding whether to grant a summary judgment motion,
the lower courts have focused on the two main factors first put forth in
Paintw'ville Hospital and later reaffirmed in Steelves.
The standards which govern the grant of summary judgment have
recently been revisited by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Steelvest.
First, the movant must show that no genuine issue of fact exists, that
is[,] it must convince the court by the evidence of record, of the
nonexistence of an issue of material fact. Second, the movant must
demonstrate its "right to judgment ... with such clarity that there is no
room left for controversy." "Only when it appears impossible for the
non-moving party to produce evidence at trial warranting ajudgment in
[its] favor should the motion for summary judgment be granted."''
The "such clarity" and "impossibility" factors raised questions concerning
whether a Kentucky state court would ever grant another summary
judgment. In fact, based on the reaction that the case caused in the legal
community, one would think that a summary judgment motion would not
be granted in this state again."9 Despite the harsh language of Steelvest,
however, summary judgments have indeed been granted by Kentucky
courts in a number of cases since the Steelvest ruling."4
on summary judgment quite heavily. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text
(discussing the author's observations regarding the Steelvest standard as perceived by local
attorneys).
138 Ward v. Commonwealth, 814 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
teelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 482) (emphasis added).
n' See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing the author's observations
regarding the Steelvest standard as perceived by local attorneys).
'4* See Coppage v. Ohio County Bd. of Educ., 860 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Ky. CL App.
1992) (In the instant case, the circuit court correctly applied the above standards of law
[of Palntsvinle Hospital and Steelvest] in entering a summary judgment for the
appellees."'); Farmer v. Heard, 844 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) ('The standard
for granmting summary judgment is set forth in Steelvest .... Viewing the evidence in the
strongest possible light in favor of the appellant, Farmer, we conclude that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the trial court's summary judgment was
correc'); Huddleston ex rel. Lynch v. Hughes, 843 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992)
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For example, citing to the Steelvest decision, the court of appeals in
Fryxell v. Clark noted that "[tlhe facts are undisputed, and the only issues
are the ones of law, which we may freely review."'41 The court of
appeals then proceeded to affirm the granting of a summary judgment by
the trial court.'42 Moreover, in at least one case the court of appeals
went so far as to grant summary judgment for the adverse party. 43 In
contrast, several courts, citing to the stringent standards put forth under
Steelvest, have rejected a movant's request for summary judgment.'
Regardless of whether or not the courts have granted the motion, most
cases that have turned upon the issuance or nonissuance of the motion
have addressed the strict "impossibility" and "such clarity" factors in
their analysis of the summary judgment issue.
For example, in Estep v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Investment Trust, the
plaintif Ann Estep, brought a negligence action against a shopping
center after she had slipped and fallen on an ice-covered sidewalk"45
The Estep Court, considering all of the evidence and applying the
Steelvest court's test, reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
for the defendants.'" In denying the defendant's summary judgment
motion, the court of appeals stated that "our Supreme Court [in Steelvest]
adhered to the principle that summary judgment should be cautiously
(holding that summary judgment for the defendant was proper); Laurel Run Resources,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 853 S.W.2d 905, 906-07 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that
summary judgment is appropriate even considering Paintsville Hospital and &tee/vest);
Lee & Mason Int'l Agency, Inc. v. Daugherty, 828 S.W.2d 677, 678-79 (Ky. CL App.
1992) (affimning summary judgment for the defendants); Mayo v. Century 21 Action
Realtors, Inc., 823 S.W.2d 466, 470 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing summary judgment
for one party, but remanding with directions to grant it for the other party); Jones v.
Hanna, 814 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (affimning summary judgment on terms
of a rental agreement between the parties); Middletown Eng'g Co. v. Climate Control
Conditioning Co., 810 S.W.2d 57, 60 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (affiming grant of summary
judgment); Ward, 814 S.W.2d at 589, 592 (affirming summary judgment regarding
environmental violations).
'4' Fryxell v. Clark, 856 S.W.2d 892, 893 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).
'4 Id at 892, 895.
' See Mayo, 823 S.W.2d at 470.
4 See Wyatt v. Mullins, No. 91-CA-002628-MR, 1993 Ky. App. LEXIS 118, at *4-5
(Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 1993) (opinion not final and not to be cited as authority) (citing
Steelvst); Kirkwood v. Courier Journal, 858 S.W.2d 194, 197, 199 (Ky. CL App. 1993)
(stating that plaintiff "manifestly cleared the Steelvest hurdle" and thus was entitled "to
have her day in courV'); Estep v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust, 843 S.W.2d 911, 913-
15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that summary judgment was improper because of material
factual disputes).
145 EStep, 843 S.W.2d at 912-13.
'4 Id. at 912-15.
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applied and not used as a substitute for trial"' 47 The court then went
on to apply the oft-quoted "impossibility" language used in Steelvest and
Paintlile Hospital.'"
In Huddleston ex rel. Lynch v. Hughes,'49 however, the court of
appeals affirmed the granting of summary judgment to the defendant. The
plaintiffa Steven Huddleston, brought a personal injury action through his
mother based on the theories of attractive nuisance and premises liability
against the landowner/defendant, Bishop William Hughes. The trial court
determined that, based on the evidence brought forth, no genuine dispute
of material fact existed. 5 ' The court of appeals affirmed this finding,
stating:
Although it is a close call, even under the stringent standard established
in Steelvest we must hold that summary judgment for the defendant was
appropriate on this issue. Given the evidence that Huddleston managed
to adduce, no jury could reasonably determine that the Covington
School did not know and condone the public's making recreational use
of its property.'
5 '
Thus, these cases exemplify the differing results by the state courts in
dealing with summary judgment motions, even after the supposedly "clear
and unambiguous" standard put forth by the Kentucky Supreme Court in
Steelvest.
That lower courts adhering to the "such clarity" and "impossibility"
factors of Steelvest have continued to grant summary judgments indicates
that the courts, in applying these standards, have taken a practical
approach in lieu of a technical or literal approach to the Kentucky
Supreme Court's ruling." In fact, the Kentucky Supreme Court itself
made a statement in its Perkins v. Hausladen" opinion, seemingly
backing away from the harsh terminology employed in the Steelvest case:
"In Steelvest, we reaffirmed our strict standard for granting summary
judgment, rejecting the turn to a more liberal approach found in recent
"14d a at 913.
149 Id
-9 843 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
"0 Id. at 902-03.
1 Id at 904.
" See, e.g., Wallace v. Scott, 844 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that
"[a]lthough Steelvest made it more difficult to gain a summary judgment, it did not
exclude it from our trial procedures").
"3 828 S.W.2d 652 (Ky. 1992).
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Federal cases. We accept that 'impossible' is used in apractical sense, not
in an absolute sense.""IM
Notably, since the Steelvest decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court
has upheld the granting of a summary judgment motion in at least four
reported cases155 and has denied discretionary review to at least four
court of appeals' cases in which the award of summary judgment was up-
held.1" These actions by the Kentucky Supreme Court have demon-
strated to the legal community that summary judgment will continue to
be granted, even under the exacting standard set forth in Steelvest. Of
course, the Kentucky Supreme Court has also continued to reject the
application of summary judgment in particular cases.1" The message
to be taken from these post-Steelvest rulings, however, is that although
the legal community feared that the summary judgment procedure was
dead after Steelvest's resounding reaffirmance of Paintswille Hospital, the
procedure is still alive and well, albeit exacting a heavier toll on those
movants trying to obtain summary judgment.
In Kentucky, trial courts seeking to deny a summary judgment motion
have a powerful tool available. Most appellate decisions evaluating the
use of the summary judgment procedure have referred to the "impossi-
bility" language used in Paintsville Hospital and in Steelvest" More-
1' Id. at 654 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
... See Capital Area Right to Life, Inc. v. Downtown Frankfort, Inc., 862 S.W.2d 297,
297 (Ky. 1993) (affirming summary judgment); Mullins v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co.,
839 S.W.2d 245, 247, 250 (Ky. 1992) (citing Steelvest and stating that, even when the
evidence was viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, no genuine issue of material fact
existed); Mitchell v. Hadl, 816 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. 1991); Commissioners of Sinking Fund
v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 809 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Ky. 1991) (per curiam) (adopting
opinion of the court of appeals, which reversed with directions to grant summary
judgment).
" See Coppage v. Ohio County Bd. of Educ., 860 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992),
discretionary review denied, No. 91-CA-2064-MR (March 12, 1993); Yount v. Calvert,
826 S.W.2d 833 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991), discretionary review denied, No. 90-CA-454-MR,
90-CA-1098-MR (May 6, 1992); Hendrix v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 937
(Ky. Ct. App. 1991), discretionary review denied, No. 90-CA-001696-MR (March 4,
1992); Mobile Co., Inc. v. American States Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. Ct. App.
1991), discretionary review denied, No. 90-CA-2086-MR (March 4, 1992).
'" See Mcntosh v. Helton, 828 S.W.2d 364, 364-65 (Ky. 1992) (affirming a reversal
of summary judgment).
. See, e.g., Estep v. B.F. Saul Real Estate Inv. Trust, 843 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1992) (quoting Steelvest and Paintsville Hospital and reversing summary judgment);
Jones v. Hanna, 814 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Steelvest and
Paintsville Hospital and affirming summary judgment); Ward v. Commonwealth, 814
S.W.2d 589, 590-91 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (referring to Steelvest and Paintwville Hospital
but affirming summary judgment).
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over, the Kentucky Supreme Court, after its opinion in Perkins v.
Hausladen,59 continues to apply the "impossibility" and "such clarity"
factors in judging whether summary judgment motions should have been
granted."6 Thus, although Steelvest has consistently been hailed by the
lower courts as announcing the authoritative standard for summary
judgment, its application has not been consistent: some courts have taken
a more literal approach to the Kentucky Supreme Court's language, while
other courts have taken a more practical approach.' 6'
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment procedure has been the subject of much
debate in past years. In the 1986 United States Supreme Court trilogy of
cases, the Court reestablished summary judgment as a viable pretrial tool
available for weeding out unfounded litigation in the federal system. In
turn, many state courts reexamined their approaches to the motion in light
of the trilogy decisions. Throughout this process, the procedure has been
scrutinized and reinterpreted. In 1991, the Kentucky Supreme Court used
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc. to reestablish a strict
approach to summary judgment, embracing the standards articulated in
Painisville Hospital Co. v. Rose "as providing the authoritative standard
for assessing summary judgment motions. Steelvest thereby establishes a
rigorous burden that must be met by a party endeavoring to secure a
summary judgment .... 162 In opting for a stringent standard, the
Kentucky Supreme Court distinguished the Kentucky standard from that
now used in the federal system. The court emphatically noted that
although the new federal standard is not devoid of merit, Kentucky will
not follow the United States Supreme Court's lead in encouraging a more
liberal use of the summary judgment procedure."
'" 828 S.W.2d 652 (Ky. 1992). See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text
(discussing the Perlans decision).
" See Conrad Chevrolet, Inc. v. Rood, 862 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Ky. 1993) (citing both
Paintsville Hospital and Steelvest).
The Supreme Court itself seems to be wavering at the strict, almost unmanageable
language of the Steelvest opinion. See supra text accompanying note 154.
1 " Huddleston ex rel. Lynch v. Hughes, 843 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992)
(emphasis added).
3 Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480-83 (Ky. 1991). The
court stated that the new liberal approach was especially attractive because it would
provide for the quicker disposition of many of the multitude of cases which bog down the
federal system. Nevertheless, the court rejected this approach because it did not see a
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By maintaining such a high standard, the Kentucky Supreme Court
has generated a great deal of controversy as to what summary judgment
now means in Kentucky courts. Some members of the legal community
seem to believe that adherence to such a strict standard has eliminated
almost any hope that defendants may have had in obtaining summary
judgment. Yet, in looking at the actual practice over the past few years,
the courts have continued to grant summary judgment motions, albeit
making counsel for the movants work harder at showing that no genuine
issue of material fact exists. 1" The Kentucky Supreme Court has also
apparently backed away from the harshness of its terminology in the
Steelvest decision by explaining that the "impossibility" factor should be
considered in a practical sense, not a literal one. 65 Hence, if the courts
continue to move toward a practical approach in applying the standard set
forth in Steelvest, the summary judgment procedure will remain alive and
well in Kentucky.
However, as with the federal rule before the revolutionary trilogy of
Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex, this seemingly inflexible standard has
created confusion within the Kentucky legal community and court system.
In order to alleviate the discomfort that the courts have been experiencing
in interpreting the Steelvest ruling, the Kentucky Supreme Court should
reevaluate and clarify its position once again in light of the trilogy and
in light of the true purpose of the summary judgment procedure. The
Kentucky Supreme Court's reasoning that the summary judgment
procedure should be used cautiously because it prohibits claims from
proceeding on to trial is sound. The court need not make the procedure
unworkable, however, by putting forth such a harsh and exacting test. In
today's flood of litigation the summary judgment tool can be an effective
one in the administration of justice, if wielded appropriately. Because
summary judgment forecloses a party's day in court, the tool should only
be used in order to avoid needless discovery and litigation of issues that
are frivolous. The federal courts first adopted the summary judgment
procedure in order to eliminate meaningless claims. The Kentucky
Supreme Court must remember this original purpose before requiring
similar problem within the Kentucky court system: "[T]he new federal standards do have
appeal, but we perceive no oppressive or unmanageable case backlog or problems with
unmeritorious or frivolous litigation in the state's courts that would require us to adopt a
new approach such as the new federal standards." Id. at 482-83.
' See supra notes 138-61 and accompanying text (summarizing summary judgment
practice in Kentucky since the Steelvest decision).
'6' See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text (summarizing the Kentucky
Supreme Court's view since Steelvest).
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application of a standard so harsh that movants will never be granted the
motion. Such a standard could render the rule, and obviously the purpose
of the rule, moot.
By retreating from its "impossibility" language, however, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has prevented the summary judgment procedure
from becoming moot. Yet, because the court has in one breath made a
harsh and exacting standard and in the next breath undermined this
standard by stating that courts should apply the "impossibility" and
"such clarity" factors in a practical sense, the court has created a bastion
of mixed interpretations and confusion, similar to that which existed in
the federal system before the United States Supreme Court's trilogy. Thus,
the hope is that the Kentucky Supreme Court will realize that it can
require a strict standard for the procedure, similar to the traditional
federal standard, without exacting such an "impossible" standard for
movants to meet and, subsequently, revise the summary judgment
standard in order to preserve the original purpose of the rule.
Heather C. Wright
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